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I. Introduction 
On the day before the European Commission’s 
decision on the fitness of Bulgaria and Romania to 
become EU members on 1 January 2007 (due to be 
delivered 16 May 2006), it is becoming 
increasingly evident that the EU has fallen into its 
own ‘rhetorical trap’ from which there is no easy 
way out. Most EU officials and politicians would 
agree that the governance standards in the two 
Balkan candidates are not up to EU level yet, but 
everyone knows that there is not much the EU 
can do about it at this point.  
The accession stories of Bulgaria and Romania 
are an excellent illustration of the EU being 
caught unawares when making important (legal 
and political) commitments to two future 
members while taking in good faith the 
commitments pledged by the same members-to-
be. When the EU announced its ‘big-bang’ 
enlargement decision in 2002, Sofia and 
Bucharest sought reassurance that they would not 
be kept waiting for a long time. And they were 
successful in getting the EU to officially agree to 
a very concrete accession timetable against 
promises to improve their judiciary systems and 
to reduce the level of corruption, among other 
reforms. 
In 2006, a year before the fixed accession date, the 
EU is no longer convinced that Bulgaria and 
Romania qualify to join the club judging by their 
governance standards only. Corruption and 
organised crime have not been reined in by either 
of the two, although Bucharest has recently 
impressed Brussels with its political courage to take 
brave last-minute initiatives to that end. To be sure, 
the situation in the two countries has not become 
worse in the years following the EU’s decision on 
their accession.  
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The reality, however, is that Bulgaria and Romania may 
have become EU-compliant on paper only and that the 
image projected to Brussels by their political leaders 
differs from the situation on the ground.  
That Brussels is finally waking up to the real facts is not 
so bad. Better later than never. What is not so good is that 
the EU finds itself in a trap of its own making. On the one 
hand, the EU cannot renege on previous pledges. If the 
EU shirks its own obligations, it would do damage to its 
own reputation. On the other hand, the EU cannot let two 
unprepared candidates in without serious costs. If the EU 
lowers the accession threshold, it would not only threaten 
its own internal functioning, but it would also send a 
wrong message to all the other accession hopefuls 
waiting at the EU door.  
The question is what to do in the remaining months 
before the end of the year in order to avoid the damage 
that could be done. In the last months the European 
Commission has desperately been looking for instruments 
to regain leverage over the political leaderships in Sofia 
and Bucharest while realising that it will be politically 
harmful for the EU to renege on its own commitments. It 
is in this context that the discussion about the safeguard 
clauses inserted in the Accession Treaty started.  
II. Accession  postponement 
The postponement clause (see Appendix 1) is the one that 
has provoked most media speculation in the last weeks. 
The possibility for delaying Bulgaria and/or Romania’s 
entry by one year, however, does not give the EU much 
space to manoeuvre. First, both 2007 and 2008 are very 
soon, whereas the type of reforms Brussels expects from 
the two countries takes a longer time to deliver results. 
The postponement clause works only as a credible threat 
of delay and the European Commission in particular has 
been good at creating the political atmosphere for 
achieving this credibility effect. If the real concern is how 
to keep up the pressure on Bulgaria and Romania so that 
they continue with domestic reforms, not much can be 
gained by just one year’s postponement of their 
accession. 
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Second, the postponement clause is more difficult to 
activate in the case of Bulgaria, which is currently 
considered less ready. Unanimity in the Council is 
needed for postponing Bulgaria’s accession date, whereas 
a qualified majority vote is sufficient to delay Romania. 
This difference is a reflection of the perceived state of 
readiness of the two countries at the time of closing 
accession negotiations with them in 2004. The perceived 
gap between the two opened up in the course of 2006. 
Yet the legal instruments at the EU’s disposal were 
designed to hold off Romania more easily than Bulgaria.  
The main dissimilarity between Bulgaria and Romania at 
the moment is not so much a matter of differences in their 
governance standards but a question of perceived 
political will of their respective governments to tackle the 
problems singled out by the EU. Against the background 
of the determined actions of the current government in 
Bucharest, the leadership in Sofia appears unconvincing. 
In general, the EU is reluctant to penalise pro-reform 
political forces because they are the ones driving the 
Europeanisation agenda in each domestic context. Given 
the perceived gap in the reform credentials of the 
Popescu-Tariceanu and Stanishev governments in 
Bucharest and Sofia, respectively, the EU finds it difficult 
to reward one and punish the other while treating them as 
a ‘couple’ lagging behind.  
III. Safeguards  post-accession 
What can the EU do, post-accession, to discipline 
disinclined political elites? There are three provisions in 
the Accession Treaty that provide the legal basis for 
taking protective measures against Bulgaria and/or 
Romania in matters of the economy, the internal market 
and in the area of justice, security and liberty, for three 
years after accession (see Appendix 2 for the exact legal 
text). These safeguard clauses form part of the Accession 
Treaties of the new member states from Central and 
Eastern Europe too, but the possibility for invoking them 
in the context of the ‘big bang’ enlargement was never 
seriously discussed. For Bulgaria and Romania’s 
imminent accession, this has changed.  
The economic safeguard clause provides the legal basis 
for taking protective measures against a member state 
(old or new) in the case of temporary economic 
difficulties experienced by one or more sectors as a result 
of the inclusion of new members in the single market. 
While such situations are not impossible, there is not 
much one can do to avoid them. This mechanism is not 
well suited to apply pressure on Bulgaria and Romania to 
advance domestic reform post-accession. Besides, the 
problematic areas for the two countries are predominantly 
in the political domain and this is where the EU would 
like to have more post-accession leverage.  
In the internal market area, there are both hard 
instruments to penalise a member state and soft devices 
to entice a member state to comply with the EU acquis. 
Most of them do not require the activation of the internal 
market safeguard clause, which itself is vaguely defined 
and unclear as to what punitive measures it could trigger. 
As regards permanent instruments in place for old and 
new members, the infringement procedure, for instance, 
allows the Commission to take a member state to the 
European Court of Justice, if it deems that there are 
serious breaches of the functioning of the single market. 
The publishing of the Internal Market Scoreboard is 
another example of how peer pressure and public 
exposure of mediocre achievement can encourage 
corrective action. Once members, Bulgaria and Romania 
will be subject to the same mechanisms of internal 
control as the old member states. In addition, there is the 
big disincentive of discontinuing certain projects 
supported by the Structural Funds, if, for example, the 
two have not complied with the EU public procurement 
norms or have not fulfilled the regional policy 
requirements. Bulgaria and/or Romania cannot expect big 
financial transfers from the EU budget, if they mishandle 
EU money as a result of corrupt practices.  
In the area of justice and home affairs, the EU 
institutional machinery has only soft instruments at its 
disposal to influence member state behaviour. This is a 
reflection of the largely intergovernmental nature of the 
policy area and the relatively weaker role of the EU layer 
of governance in it. Cooperation in this domain is all 
about trust between the member states and if Bulgaria 
and/or Romania fail to reassure their EU counterparts in 
the efficiency of their judicial systems and law 
enforcement organs, they might easily feel the effects of 
exclusion from the EU club. What form might that take? 
If confidence in the Bulgarian or Romanian judiciary is 
low, decisions of their courts on EU law cases may not be 
recognised in the rest of the EU. If trust in the Bulgarian 
or Romanian police structures is not there, it is highly 
unlikely that other member states will act upon European 
Arrest Warrants issued at the request of Bulgarian or 
Romanian prosecution organs. On a more symbolic 
political level, the two countries might be denied access 
to some common initiatives and future policies in the area 
of police and judicial cooperation, but this could only 
concern initiatives outside the legal basis of the EU 
treaties. In short, there are ways to make them feel that 
they are getting a ‘second-class’ treatment from their 
European peers.  
IV. Monitoring the rule of law post-accession 
Mechanisms to try to influence the reform patterns of the 
two countries post-accession exist, but they are much 
weaker compared to the conditionality applied prior to 
accession and it remains to be seen how effective they 
will prove to be. To keep an eye on respect for the rule of 
law in Bulgaria and Romania, the area in which both 
countries appear most vulnerable and where there is room 
for improvement, the EU has both legal means and 
political authority to monitor internal developments 
within the two countries after their accession to the EU.  Bulgaria and Romania’s Accession to the EU | 3 
 
On the hard side of measures, the Treaty on European 
Union provides the legal basis for sanctioning member 
states that are found to be in breach of “the principles of 
liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles 
which are common to the member states” (Art. 6 of the 
Treaty on European Union reproduced in Appendix 3). 
Art. 7 of the Treaty (see also Appendix 3) lays out the 
procedure for penalising a member state by its peers for 
falling short in upholding the common values on which 
the Union is founded. The legal provisions allow for 
suspension of the voting rights of a member state 
government in the Council, a decision that can be taken 
by qualified majority by the Heads of State or 
Government. For the procedure to be activated, there has 
to be “a serious and persistent breach” of any of the 
principles mentioned above. The rule of law reference is 
very important in this context. Undoubtedly, the drafters 
of these treaty articles hardly envisaged situations similar 
to the one in which the EU finds itself with regard to 
Bulgaria and Romania’s accession. They were 
nevertheless farsighted in equipping the Union with 
instruments for sanctioning its members in order to deter 
misconduct. Now these legal texts could be put to work 
in the event of malpractice in a new member state, 
provided that considerable political will within the rest of 
the community is mobilised to condemn the wrong-doer. 
Therefore, if the EU doubts the capacity or willingness of 
Bulgaria or Romania to fully uphold the rule of law, and 
if the rest of the member states are consensual in taking 
measures against either of the two governments, it could 
conceivably make it politically costly for new member 
state leaders who remain inactive or inefficient in fighting 
corruption and organised crime even after accession. 
On the soft side of measures, the Commission is also 
contemplating post-accession monitoring of key areas 
deemed insufficiently reformed in Bulgaria and/or 
Romania, such as the judiciary and/or the law 
enforcement organs. There are reputational costs 
involved in such peer review missions which the political 
leaders of any member state would try to avoid. For 
Bulgaria and Romania, the stakes are potentially even 
higher because they could be joining the club on different 
terms than the rest. Being singled out from the start as not 
exactly equals is not only going to be embarrassing for 
the respective governments in the European circles but 
will also provide fertile ground for their political 
opponents at home to challenge them. 
Furthermore, if Bulgaria and/or Romania accede to the 
EU with safeguards, this is not going to send the right 
signal to the markets. Investors are watching closely how 
the accession story of the two countries is evolving. 
Needless to say, a clean and functioning judiciary is 
important for a favourable business climate and a 
negative mark from the EU on a country’s judiciary 
record will have economic costs as well. The EU’s 
evaluations of the candidates’ performance during the 
pre-accession process have been important indicators for 
investors’ strategies. Bulgaria and Romania would do a 
big disservice to their economic modernisation if they 
allow investors’ confidence to wither away at this point.  
What are the implications for future enlargements of the 
EU? The Western Balkan countries are also watching 
closely what is happening with their Eastern Balkan 
neighbours. They already know that the EU is getting 
very serious about full compliance with pre-accession 
conditions and that the strategy of promising and 
simulating EU-compliant change will not fly in Brussels 
any longer. They also feel the anti-enlargement political 
climate in some quarters of the EU. The message for 
them is to get ready for a long pre-accession process in 
the course of which the Commission will want to be 
convinced that domestic reforms do not only look good 
on paper but have real impact on the governance of future 
member states.     4 | Gergana Noutcheva 
 
Appendices 
 
1. Postponement Clause 
 
Art. 39 
1. If, on the basis of the Commission's continuous monitoring of commitments undertaken by Bulgaria and Romania in 
the context of the accession negotiations and in particular the Commission's monitoring reports, there is clear evidence 
that the state of preparations for adoption and implementation of the acquis in Bulgaria or Romania is such that there is 
a serious risk of either of those States being manifestly unprepared to meet the requirements of membership by the date 
of accession of 1 January 2007 in a number of important areas, the Council may, acting unanimously on the basis of a 
Commission recommendation, decide that the date of accession of that State is postponed by one year to 1 January 
2008. 
2. Notwithstanding paragraph 1, the Council may, acting by qualified majority on the basis of a Commission 
recommendation, take the decision mentioned in paragraph 1 with respect to Romania if serious shortcomings have 
been observed in the fulfilment by Romania of one or more of the commitments and requirements listed in Annex IX, 
point I. 
3. Notwithstanding paragraph 1, and without prejudice to Article 37, the Council may, acting by qualified majority on 
the basis of a Commission recommendation and after a detailed assessment to be made in the autumn of 2005 of the 
progress made by Romania in the area of competition policy, take the decision mentioned in paragraph 1 with respect to 
Romania if serious shortcomings have been observed in the fulfilment by Romania of the obligations undertaken under 
the Europe Agreement (1) or of one or more of the commitments and requirements listed in Annex IX, point II. 
 
Source: Protocol concerning the conditions and arrangements for admission of the Republics of Bulgaria and Romania to the European 
Union, OJ L 157/29, 21.06.2005. 
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2. Specific Safeguard Clauses 
 
General Economic Clause 
Art. 36 
If, until the end of a period of up to three years after accession, difficulties arise which are serious and liable to persist 
in any sector of the economy or which could bring about serious deterioration in the economic situation of a given area, 
Bulgaria or Romania may apply for authorisation to take protective measures in order to rectify the situation and adjust 
the sector concerned to the economy of the internal market.  
In the same circumstances, any present Member State may apply for authorisation to take protective measures with 
regard to Bulgaria, Romania, or both those States. 
… 
Internal Market Safeguard Clause 
Art. 37 
If Bulgaria or Romania has failed to implement commitments undertaken in the context of the accession negotiations, 
causing a serious breach of the functioning of the internal market, including any commitments in all sectoral policies 
which concern economic activities with cross-border effect, or an imminent risk of such breach the Commission may, 
until the end of a period of up to three years after accession, upon the motivated request of a Member State or on its 
own initiative, adopt European regulations or decisions establishing appropriate measures. 
… 
Justice and Home Affairs Safeguard Clause 
Art. 38 
If there are serious shortcomings or any imminent risks of such shortcomings in Bulgaria or Romania in the 
transposition, state of implementation, or the application of the framework decisions or any other relevant 
commitments, instruments of cooperation and decisions relating to mutual recognition in the area of criminal law under 
Title VI of the Treaty on European Union and Directives and Regulations relating to mutual recognition in civil matters 
under Title IV of the Treaty establishing the European Community, and European laws and framework laws adopted on 
the basis of Sections 3 and 4 of Chapter IV of Title III of Part III of the Constitution, the Commission may, until the 
end of a period of up to three years after accession, upon the motivated request of a Member State or on its own 
initiative and after consulting the Member States, adopt European regulations or decisions establishing appropriate 
measures and specify the conditions and modalities under which these measures are put into effect.  
These measures may take the form of temporary suspension of the application of relevant provisions and decisions in 
the relations between Bulgaria or Romania and any other Member State or Member States, without prejudice to the 
continuation of close judicial cooperation. 
… 
 
Source: Protocol concerning the conditions and arrangements for admission of the Republics of Bulgaria and Romania to the European 
Union, OJ L 157/29, 21.06.2005. 
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3. Articles 6 and 7 of the Treaty on European Union 
On Fundamental EU Principles and Means in the Event of their Serious Breach 
 
Art. 6 
1.   The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States. 
2.   The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result from the constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of Community law. 
3.   The Union shall respect the national identities of its Member States. 
4.   The Union shall provide itself with the means necessary to attain its objectives and carry through its policies. 
 
Art. 7 
1.   On a reasoned proposal by one third of the Member States, by the European Parliament or by the Commission, the 
Council, acting by a majority of four fifths of its members after obtaining the assent of the European Parliament, may 
determine that there is a clear risk of a serious breach by a Member State of principles mentioned in Article 6(1), and 
address appropriate recommendations to that State. Before making such a determination, the Council shall hear the 
Member State in question and, acting in accordance with the same procedure, may call on independent persons to 
submit within a reasonable time limit a report on the situation in the Member State in question. 
The Council shall regularly verify that the grounds on which such a determination was made continue to apply. 
2.   The Council, meeting in the composition of the Heads of State or Government and acting by unanimity on a 
proposal by one third of the Member States or by the Commission and after obtaining the assent of the European 
Parliament, may determine the existence of a serious and persistent breach by a Member State of principles mentioned 
in Article 6(1), after inviting the government of the Member State in question to submit its observations. 
3.   Where a determination under paragraph 2 has been made, the Council, acting by a qualified majority, may decide to 
suspend certain of the rights deriving from the application of this Treaty to the Member State in question, including the 
voting rights of the representative of the government of that Member State in the Council. In doing so, the Council shall 
take into account the possible consequences of such a suspension on the rights and obligations of natural and legal 
persons. 
The obligations of the Member State in question under this Treaty shall in any case continue to be binding on that State. 
4.   The Council, acting by a qualified majority, may decide subsequently to vary or revoke measures taken under 
paragraph 3 in response to changes in the situation which led to their being imposed. 
5.   For the purposes of this Article, the Council shall act without taking into account the vote of the representative of 
the government of the Member State in question. Abstentions by members present in person or represented shall not 
prevent the adoption of decisions referred to in paragraph 2. A qualified majority shall be defined as the same 
proportion of the weighted votes of the members of the Council concerned as laid down in Article 205(2) of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community. 
This paragraph shall also apply in the event of voting rights being suspended pursuant to paragraph 3. 
6.   For the purposes of paragraphs 1 and 2, the European Parliament shall act by a two-thirds majority of the votes cast, 
representing a majority of its Members. 
Source: Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, OJ C 325, 24.12.2002. Recent CEPS Publications 
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